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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WALKER BANK AND TRUST COM-
PANY, a corporation, Administrator of 
the ERtates of l\UNNETTA WALKER, 
aka Nettie Walker, deceased, and ILA 
:JIINNETTA WALKER, deceased, 
.JOHN A.WALKER, deceased, and R. E. 
WALKER, ROMA WALKER GROCK 
an<l ALTA FAY WALKER LAKE, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
and 
J. B. WALKER, 
Involuntary Plaintiff, 
-YS.-
;\ rsTIN "WALKER, 
Def end ant and Appellant. 
Oase 
No.10374 
Brief in Support of Petition 
for Rehearing 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
So far as pertinent to the petition for rehearing, this 
is an action brought by respondents to set aside convey-
ances of real property to appellant from his mother on 
the ground of undue influence and her lack of mental ca-
pacity. Appellant claimed ownership to the property or, 
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m the alternati,·e if the court adjudged him not th~ 
owner, appellant claimed a lien upon the propertv for 
taxes paid, improvements made and serviees perfo.nned 
in connection therewith 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COl'RT 
AND THE SUPREME COURT 
The lower court determined the conveyanc€s to ap-
pellant from his mother were void upon the ground of 
undue influence, denied appellant's motion for a new trial 
and refused to grant alternative relief. The Supremf 
Court affirmed the lower court except with respect to 
alternative relief. The Supreme Court made provision 
for an accounting be made by appellant in which he may 
claim various credits and he charged with various items 
in connection with said property. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
Appellant seeks a rehearing on the propriety of 
affirming the judgment of the trial court with respect to 
avoidance of the deeds to appellant from his mother 
on the ground of undue influence and on the propriety 
in affirming the trial court in denying a new trial. In the 
event a rehearing is denied, appellant seeks clarification 
of the opinion heretofore rendered by the eourt in respect 
to the aooounting which the court in its opinion author· 
ized and directed to be had. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
,\.ppellant does not believe that any purpose would 
lw served in attempting to restate the facts. A full and 
thorough statement appears in the Briefs already on 
fi]P herein to which reference is hereby made. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. 1 
THE SUPREME COURT ERRED IN AFFIBM-
I~G THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL 
COURT IN ·wHICH IT WAS DETERMINED 
THE CONVEYANCES TO APPELLANT 
FROM HIS MOTHER WERE VOID. 
In its opinion this court said: 
''"' " " Putting ourselves in the shoes of the trial 
court chancellery, as we must, in a case like this, 
and gi,·ing considerable consideration to the trial 
court's 'view of the scene,' excluding unimpor-
tant matters, we cannot say he was in error." 
It would appear from the opinion that this court did 
give "considerable consideration" to the trial court's 
"Yiew of the scene." The trial court's "view of the 
scene'' as applied to this case has special significance. At 
the close of the evidence the trial court almost in a burst 
of feeling made the statements quoted on page 2 of the 
opinion indicating that his "view of the scene" was 
favorable to appellant, yet the ruling was adverse. We 
are aware of the fact that such remarks are not the 
appealable decision of the court. We have read with 
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interest but without comfort this court's treatment of th 
t . l ' e na court s apparent change of mind. It would 1~, hel~ful if a floroscopic view of the process of the change 
which would app<>ar to have occurred in the trial court's 
mind could be had. Although this is impossible yet one 
of counsel for appellant made inquiry of the trial C-Ourt 
as to what caused him to change his mind and was in-
formed by him that he was fearful the Supreme Court 
would not uphold his original view of the case. It would 
appear therefore that the appealable decision of the trial 
court was not the ''jewel of studious reflection'' as char-
acterized by this court in its opinion. Instead of being 
an "off-the-cuff facet" and a mere "gratuity from the 
bench,'' the original view expressed by the trial court 
is his real decision. At the time the trial court made the 
statement from the bench he had heard the evidence, the 
facts were well within his mind, he had an opportunity 
to observe the witnesss and to form a conclusion as l-0 
the veracity of their testimony. It is difficult to concl'i1e 
of anything in the argument or in the process of "stu-
dious reflection" which could have caused the trial court 
to back away from his original view of the case unless it 
can be explained by the statement which he made to 
counsel for the appellant. While these views of the trial 
court are not a part of the official transcript they can be 
documented by affidavit and incorporated into the record 
if this court should grant a rehearing and an opportunity 
so to do. 
By reason of the foregoing, appellant respectfully 
urges this court to review again the evidence "ith re· 
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... 
~pect to u11due influenee and evaluate the same in light 
of "·]Jat appears to have been the real decision of the 
trial ('Olll'L This heing an equity case the appellate 
<·ourt ha:- the responsibility to review the evidence, not 
\\ith a \'iPw merely as to whether it sustains the ruling 
of tbe trial court but on the merits of the evidence itself. 
If the (•\·iclenee is so evaluated, we feel the validity of 
tlir dl'edf' from appPllant 's mother must be sustained. It 
wouk1 be iuappropriate to burden this court with a repe-
tition of the whole of appellant's argument in his origi-
nal brief. However, the court will recall that the deeds 
wrre executed by appellant's mother in a bank in Mid-
,·ale, Ptah, in the presence of Dale Waters, Vice Presi-
dent and General ~fanager and were notarized by him 
(R. 317, 318) . .Mother Walker told J. B. Walker that 
it was her intention that Austin have the property be-
cause of the eare that he and his family had given (R. 
351). After the deeds had been executed she told J. B. 
shr had done so. ( R. 353) Apparently this court over-
looked this nry important fact in stating in its opinion 
that "Austin told none of the family about this incident, 
and it is ob\ious from the records that Mother Walker 
did not mention it either.'' 
There is no direct evidence in the record of undue 
influence. At most respondents have done no more than 
Rhow opportunity. We again call the court's attention 
to the following: 
This court held in Hatch v. Hatch, 46 Utah 218, 
148 P. 433, that family relationship alone is not 
Rufficient to establish confidential relationship or 
undue influence. 
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This court said in Anderson v. Thomas 
10 Utah 252, 159 P. 2d 142, ' 8 
''The plaintiff must do more than mereh- · 
. . Tl . ra1~e 
a susp1c10n. iere must be some affirmativ · 
,.J t l l R . e e11. uence o s 10w t mt ichard did exercise ad · 
11ating influenr0 over his mother and thuso~. 
duced her to part with her property. • • ••• · 
This court said rP: Bryan's Estate, 82 tttah 3q0 25P.2d610: .. 
""' "' "' Tl t 't t . · le oppor um y o exerr1se mfluence uu. 
less combined with circumstances tending to ~how 
its exercise affords no presumption that it was in 
fact exercised.'' 
POINT NO. II 
THE SUPREME COURT ERRED IN srs. 
T AINING THE RULING OF THE TRIAL 
COURT WHEREIN IT DENIED APPEL-
LANT'S l\IOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
The deeds were set aside by the trial court on the 
ground of undue influence. It would therefore seem tha'. 
testimony from disinterested persons as t-0 Mother 
Walker's intent to transfer the property to Austin would 
be material upon the question of undus influence. In 
fact, this court apparently gave considerable weight to 
the erroneous belief that nothing was said to anyone 
about transferring the property to Austin. Not only 
did she tell J. B. Walker, her son, but also Ray Smith, 
Rex Cole and Glen Schmidt, whose testimony would add 
further weight to the fact that Mother Walker for many 
years had planned to do just what she did. Such en· 
dence is of sufficient substance that with it there is 8 
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J 
rE>a~onahle likelihood that the result would have been 
differPnt. Fndue influence was not claimed as an issue 
in the pretrial order. Appellant could not have antici-
pated that it would later be the basis upon which the 
trial court would set aside the transfers. Such being 
the case. appellant should not be charged with lack of 
diligence in procuring the newly discovered evidence. 
We rrspertfully suhmit that the standards required by 
'his court for granting a new trial on the ground of 
newly discovered evidence as stated in Universal Invest-
ment Compa;ny v. Carpets, Inc., 16 Utah 2d 336, 400 P. 2d 
465, haYe been made. 
POINT III 
THE OPINION OF THIS COURT NEEDS 
CLARIFICATION AS TO THE ITEMS AP-
PELLANT ~IAY CLAIM IN THE ACCOUNT-
ING ALLO"\VED BY THIS COURT. 
In the event the Court should refuse Appellant a 
rehearing on the case, it should nevertheless clarify its 
opinion to the end that a proper and adequate account-
ing may be had between the parties. The Court will 
recall that the Walker property consisted of three tracts 
of land, a tract of approximately 11 acres shown in pink 
on Ex. 3 ; a tract shown in orange on Ex. 3 consisting of 
approximately 19 acres, and a tract known as the "creek 
property'' but not shown on Ex. 3, consisting of approxi-
mately 10 acres. The "pink" tract and the 10 acre tract 
are described in the deeds to appellant from his mother 
(Ex. P-4 and P-6). The 19 acre tract was involved in 
the .J. B. Walker case. 
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Austin farmed all of the property, paid taxes on all 
of the property and made improvements on all of the 
property. It is assumed that this Court intended that 
Austin's claims with respect thereto shall apply to all of 
the property, above described, but the opinion of the 
Court should be clarified specifically so to state. 
From approximately 1920 until the present Austin 
had almost the sole responsibility for the care of all of 
the property (R. 142). It is assumed that the account. 
ing should cover the entire period. But here again a 
clarification of the matter would facilitate the accounting. 
Until 1947 there were cows, horses and chickens on 
the property at various times (R. 418) which were cared 
for by Austin. Most of the crops grown on the propert: 
were used to feed the livestock and were used by the 
Walker family (R. 288). After the family store was 
closed in the early 1920s the only source of income of 
Mother Walker was from the sale of dairy and poultry 
products produced on the farm (R. 230). Except for 
two or three years when the property was rented, Austin 
produced the crops and cared for the livestock. From 
the language of the Court's opinion it would appear 
that appellant is entitled to be reimbursed not only for 
out-of-pocket expense but for the reasonable value of his 
labor and services in managing the property and produc-
ing the crops, as distinguished from his personal semce8. 
Although the opinion refers to "personal" services it 
does not attempt to define what are other services for 
which appellant should be compensated. We believe 
this is not only desirable but mandatory if a properl)' 
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accounting is to be had. The Court should at least en-
li"'hten the parties as to the scope of the items for which 
"' appellant should be given credit as well as the items for 
which he should be charged. 
CONCLUSION 
The principal purpose of this petition for rehearing 
is to urge the court to evaluate the evidence with respect 
to undue influence. Compelling reasons for this are set 
forth iu Point I. If the evidence is viewed on its merits it 
warrants but one conclusion - that the validity of the 
deeds from his mother to appellant sb'ould be upheld. 
In determining that the deed should be avoided on 
the ground of undue influence, this court was apparently 
of the opinion that in lieu of the property Austin should 
be compensated for his services in connection therewith. 
As stated aho,;e, appellent respectfully urges that the 
court uphold the validity of said deeds. However, if the 
court rejects the foregoing, appellant respectfully urges, 
in order to minimize the possibility of further litigation, 
:hat this court make clarification of the items which he 
ma~· elaim in the accounting as suggested in Point III. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HAROLD R. BOYER 
of Romney & Boyer 
Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
and 
ARTHUR H. NIELSEN 
Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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